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This paper assesses the impact of corporate taxation on multinational activity. A numerically 
solvable general equilibrium model of trade and multinational firms is used to incorporate the 
following components of corporate taxation: parent and host country statutory corporate tax 
rates, withholding tax rates, and parent and host country depreciation allowances. We account 
for their differential impact under alternative methods of double taxation relief (i.e., credit, 
exemption, and deduction). The hypotheses regarding the effects of changes in the tax 
parameters are investigated in a panel of bilateral OECD outbound stocks of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from 1991 to 2002. For this, we compile annual information on taxation to 
construct the largest existing panel of tax parameters at the bilateral level based on national 
tax law and bilateral tax treaties. Our findings indicate that the parent country's statutory 
corporate tax rate tends to foster outward FDI, whereas the host country's statutory corporate 
and withholding tax rates are negatively associated with outward FDI. Depreciation 
allowances exert a significant impact on FDI, as hypothesized. 
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June 2006 1 Introduction
What are the expected e®ects of parent and host country parameters of taxation
(statutory corporate and withholding tax rates, and the de¯nition of the tax
base) on bilateral multinational activity in general equilibrium under alternative
methods of double taxation relief? What is their impact on bilateral stocks of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in an empirical application? These issues are of
obvious importance to policy makers. Yet, existing research does not provide an
encompassing answer to these questions, as will be illustrated in detail below.
The importance of relying on general equilibrium models to derive the hy-
potheses regarding the impact of taxation on FDI has been pointed out by
Hines (1997, p. 418):
"In the absence of a complete general equilibrium model, it is impos-
sible to predict with certainty the impact of tax changes on capital
demand throughout a multinational ¯rm."
This paper analyzes the relationship between taxation and FDI in a
knowledge-capital general equilibrium model of multinational enterprises
(MNEs; see Markusen, 1997, 2002). This framework seems especially suited
for studying the role of corporate taxation on FDI, since it has become the
workhorse model of numerous recent empirical studies on the determinants
of bilateral multinational activity (e.g., Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001;
Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Blonigen, Davies, and Head, 2003; Braconier,
NorbÄ ack, and Urban, 2005). Controlling for the most important endowment-
related and trade and investment impediment-related determinants of FDI, we
analyze the role of parent and host country parameters of taxation under alter-
native methods of double taxation relief. The model enables us to predict the
sign of the e®ect of an increase in each parameter of taxation on multinational
activity, separately. One particular advantage of this general equilibrium model
is that taxation does not only a®ect the extent of multinational activity (as,
e.g., in Devereux and Hubbard, 2003, and in Devereux and Lockwood, 2006),
but even the con¯guration of plants and the integration strategies of ¯rms in
equilibrium.
Based on the insights of the theoretical model we use parent and host statu-
tory country corporate tax rates, withholding tax rates, (net present values of)
parent and host country depreciation allowances, and information about the
underlying method of double taxation relief (i.e., credit, exemption, and deduc-
tion) in the empirical exercise. We collect annual data from national tax codes
1and bilateral double tax treaties for 26 OECD countries over the period 1991 to
2002. Accordingly, the time-variant tax components vary at the parent-to-host
country-pair rather than the host country (unilateral) level. Overall, we obtain
about 8000 data points for each bilateral tax component. To the best of our
knowledge, this represents the largest existing panel data set of tax compo-
nents. We assess the impact of all tax parameters separately on real bilateral
outbound FDI stocks. The majority of the estimated parameter signs of the
taxation variables is in accordance with the theoretical hypotheses. An omission
of withholding tax rates and depreciation allowances in empirical speci¯cations
seems to ignore important dimensions of taxation and likely leads to biased
estimates of the pure corporate tax e®ect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
a brief review of the existing literature. Section 3 presents a Markusen-type
knowledge-capital model of trade and multinational ¯rms, which accounts for
the mentioned parameters of taxation and the methods of double taxation relief.
Section 4 discusses the major testable hypotheses relating to the parameters of
taxation. Section 5 describes the empirical speci¯cation. Section 6 presents the
empirical ¯ndings and provides a sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes with
a summary of the most important ¯ndings.
2 Previous research
Under which conditions and to which extent corporate taxes in°uence a ¯rm's
location and production decisions is lively debated, not only among policy mak-
ers but also among researchers (see Hines, 1997, 1999; Gresik, 2001; Devereux,
2006, for comprehensive surveys). If ¯rms cannot arbitrarily shift their pro¯ts
abroad, taxes reduce their after-tax pro¯ts and this, in turn, a®ects both the
location and the volume of FDI. Then, a high tax burden in a host country
represents an impediment to its inbound FDI, even if its e®ect is partly o®set
to the extent that governments use tax revenues to reduce investment costs.
In fact, this reasoning may explain why several industrialized countries have
recently reduced their corporate tax rates.1 For instance, in the Western Euro-
1Within the OECD, the statutory corporate tax rate (excluding local corporate income
taxes) fell by 15 percent between 2000 and 2005, where the strongest reductions took place in
Austria (2005, from 34 to 25 percent), Belgium (2005, from 39 to 33 percent), Canada (several
reductions 2000-2005, from 28 to 21 percent), Germany (2001, from 40 to 25 percent), Iceland
(2002, from 30 to 18 percent), Ireland (several reductions 2000-2005, from 24 to 12.5 percent)
and Luxembourg (2002, from 30 to 22 percent). Among the Eastern European members, the
lowest levels of corporate tax rates amount to 16 percent (Hungary, since 2004) and 19 percent
(Poland and Slovak Republic, since 2004), respectively.
2pean economies corporate tax rates have been reduced in response to the much
lower tax rates in Central and Eastern Europe.
Empirical evidence tends to con¯rm the presumption that taxation is de-
cisive for production and location decisions of MNEs. The bulk of results is
available for the U.S. (see Hines, 1997, for an excellent overview). Three strands
of the literature can be distinguished here. One of them analyzes the impact
of U.S. corporate tax rates on inbound FDI (see, e.g., Hartman, 1984; Bar-
tik, 1985; Coughlin, Terza, and Arromdee, 1991; Head, Ries, and Swenson,
1999). A second line of research studies the e®ects of host country taxes on
U.S. outbound FDI (see Grubert and Mutti, 1991, 2000; Hines and Rice, 1994;
Devereux and Gri±th, 1998; Grubert and Slemrod, 1998; Altshuler, Grubert,
and Newlon, 2001; Mutti and Grubert, 2004; Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2005).
A third strand of work considers both parent and host country taxation by
additionally accounting for the role of the underlying method of double taxa-
tion relief, i.e., whether (repatriated) pro¯ts of foreign a±liates are taxed on
a territorial or a worldwide basis in the country where the headquarters are
located (see Slemrod, 1990; Shah and Slemrod, 1991; Cummins and Hubbard,
1995; Swenson, 1994, 2001; Hines, 1996). In general, the U.S. evidence reveals
that inbound FDI is negatively a®ected by the U.S. tax burden,2 and U.S. out-
bound FDI is positively (negatively) associated with domestic (host country)
tax rates. Although one would expect that the impact of tax rates di®ers be-
tween countries applying the credit and exemption method (see, e.g., Slemrod,
1990),3 there is no clear-cut empirical support for this view.
Only a few studies consider a broader set of country-pairs. Devereux and
Freeman (1995), using bilateral FDI °ows between seven countries (including
the U.S.) from 1984 to 1989 and referring to a cost-of-capital concept of taxa-
tion, ¯nd that a ¯rm's choice between domestic and foreign investment as such
is not in°uenced by taxation. However, given that a ¯rm has decided to invest
abroad, taxation is decisive for where the investment takes place. The results of
B¶ enassy-Qu¶ er¶ e, Fontagn¶ e, and Lahrµ eche-R¶ evil (2005), relying on bilateral FDI
°ows among 11 OECD countries over the period 1984-2000 and using statutory
corporate tax rates as well as (forward-looking) e®ective marginal (EMTR)
2One notable exception is Swenson (1994), who ¯nds that the increased after-tax cost
of capital after the Tax Reform Act 1986 induced an increase in U.S. inbound FDI. The
underlying reason is that the broadening of the tax base raised the attractiveness of U.S.
assets for foreign investors whose parent countries allowed a tax credit against taxes abroad
(see Scholes and Wolfson, 1990, for a theoretical foundation of this argument).
3Under the credit method, foreign-earned pro¯ts are taxed both in the parent and the
host country, but the foreign taxes are deductible from the domestic tax liability. Under the
exemption method, by way of contrast, foreign-earned pro¯ts are only taxed abroad.
3and average tax rates (EATR) as published in Devereux, Gri±th, and Klemm
(2002), indicate a signi¯cant role of tax di®erentials for foreign plant location.
Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2005) point out that statutory tax rates a®ect
FDI °ows in two ways. First, they determine whether it is pro¯table for any
¯rm to invest in a particular host country at all (sample selection). Second,
given that some investment takes place, they a®ect the magnitude of these in-
vestments. Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2005) ¯nd supportive evidence for
these hypotheses in a panel of bilateral OECD FDI °ows. Regarding invest-
ment °ows to Central and Eastern European countries, Carstensen and Toubal
(2004) observe a signi¯cant negative impact of the di®erence in host and parent
country statutory corporate tax rates on inward FDI.4
Overall, previous empirical research is characterized by two features. First,
most of the existing literature considers the parent and/or host country tax
rate or composite measures of tax burden (e.g., forward- or backward-looking
e®ective tax rates). The former approach ignores important tax-related deter-
minants of FDI, such as depreciation allowances or host country withholding
taxes (see Clark, 2000; OECD, 2001). The problem with the latter approach is
that it is di±cult to draw strong conclusions about the 'composite' impact of
the tax components through e®ective tax rates on MNE activity.5 In particular,
our theoretical hypotheses shed light on the fact that some of the components
of e®ective tax rates exert a non-monotonic e®ect on FDI, where the sign of
the impact depends on the relative prevalence of multinational versus national
¯rms.
Second, many of the existing applications tend to rely on an eclectic ap-
proach to specifying empirical FDI equations. In this regard, Hines (1999, p.
311) emphasizes that
"[O]ne of the di±culties facing all cross-sectional studies of FDI lo-
cation is the inevitable omission of many important determinants of
FDI that may be correlated with tax rates and therefore bias estima-
tion of tax elasticities."
4De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), performing a meta-analysis based on 25 empirical studies
on FDI and taxation, estimate a (median) tax rate elasticity of -3.3. Focusing on U.S. studies,
Hines (1997) reports a tax rate elasticity of approximately -0.6.
5Basically, e®ective tax rates are an aggregate measure of company tax burden, i.e., the
same level of the e®ective tax rate may be a result of di®erent combinations of its components.
Hence, an increase of e®ective tax rates may be due to entirely di®erent changes in the
underlying components. More importantly, it can be shown that in a general equilibrium
model of trade and multinationals as the one applied below, e®ective (marginal and average)
tax rates change across endowment con¯gurations, even if the tax parameters themselves
remain unchanged. Hence, e®ective tax rates are endogenous even for given tax rates.
4Of course, this argument does not advocate an empirical analysis that uses
all available explanatory variables, disregarding their theoretical relevance. But
rather, it makes the case for a speci¯cation of FDI capturing the most important
empirical determinants consistent with theory. Following this advice, we employ
an empirical speci¯cation based on a variant of the knowledge-capital model of
multinational ¯rms.
3 A numerically solvable general equilibrium model
of trade and multinational ¯rms under corporate
taxation
Consider two economies, indexed fi;jg = f1;2g, and two sectors, Z and X.
Z is a homogeneous (agricultural) good produced at constant returns to scale.
There is a large number of varieties of (manufactures) X that are imperfect
substitutes as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
X can be produced by three types of ¯rms. National enterprises (NEs) serve
domestic consumers locally and foreign ones via exports. The corresponding
number of NEs in country i is denoted by ni. Horizontal MNEs headquartered
in country i run a plant each at home and abroad. Hence, they serve consumers
in both countries through local production and do not engage in trade. The
central motives to enter as a horizontal MNE are the avoidance of trade costs
and the exploitation of multi-plant economies of scale. hi indicates the number
of horizontal MNEs headquartered in i. Vertical MNEs unbundle their head-
quarters' activities from the production process. They produce headquarters'
services in the skilled labor abundant economy and locate production in the
unskilled labor abundant country. They serve foreign consumers locally and
domestic ones via exports from their foreign subsidiary. vi denotes the number
of vertical MNEs headquartered in i.
Quantities are indexed as follows. The superscript indicates the ¯rm type,
the ¯rst subscript refers to the country where the ¯rm is headquartered, the
second one denotes the country where the variety is produced, and the third
subscript labels the economy where the variety is consumed. For instance,
Xn
iij is the production of manufactures produced by a single NE of i in i for
consumers in j. Consider a horizontal MNE with headquarters in country i.
Then, Xh
ijj indicates this ¯rm's production in country j for consumers there.
Now, focus on a vertical MNE with headquarters in i. Such a ¯rm's production
in country j for consumers in i is denoted by Xv
iji. Subscripts are used in the
5same way with the homogeneous good Z.
3.1 Households
Preferences are assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas nest of the homogeneous Z-
good and the di®erentiated X-good. The price of Z serves as the num¶ eraire. Ui
describes the utility function of a representative household in country i, where
¹ denotes the ¯xed expenditure share for di®erentiated products and ¾ > 1 is
the elasticity of substitution between di®erentiated product varieties:
Ui = X
¹







































Transportation of the di®erentiated X-good across the border is subject to
iceberg transport costs (¿) for the shipment of each unit. Z-goods, in contrast,
are costlessly tradeable.
For each ¯rm type and location, the utility maximization of consumers yields






























i ¹Ei 8 i 6= j 2 f1;2g: (2)
Ei represents the total expenditures of consumers in country i. The price index




































6Ziii + Zjji = (1 ¡ ¹)Ei: (5)
3.2 Production and labor market
The production function for Z is a CES technology being identical in both
countries. It uses skilled labor (S) and unskilled labor (L), at a technical rate
of substitution of 1=(1 ¡ ½):
Ziii + Ziij = [aS
½





where a is a weighting parameter. Since all ¯rms within a country face the
same homothetic technology and identical factor prices, the Z-sector input co-
e±cients are identical across ¯rms. Let wSi and wLi denote the factor rewards
for skilled and unskilled labor in country i. Skipping the arguments, these input
















































Perfect competition in the production of the homogeneous Z ensures zero pro¯ts
so that unit costs satisfy
aLZiwLi + aSZiwSi ¸ 1 ? Ziii ¸ 0;Ziij ¸ 0 8 i;j 2 f1;2g; (9)
where ? indicates that at least one of the adjacent conditions has to hold
with equality. Zero trade costs lead to an equalization of marginal costs across
countries.
The production of manufactures X uses both factors in ¯xed proportions
(see Markusen, 2002), where aLX and aSX are the corresponding input coe±-
cients for production. The set-up of ¯rms in the X-sector requires skilled labor
in order to produce ¯rm-speci¯c assets and blueprints as well as unskilled labor
to set up plant-speci¯c assets (production facilities). In line with the literature,
we assume that ¯xed input requirements are highest for horizontal MNEs, lower
for vertical MNEs, and lowest for NEs. Speci¯cally, national ¯rms need 2 units
of skilled labor, while (horizontal and vertical) MNEs employ 2+ µ units. This
accounts for the higher ¯rm-speci¯c ¯xed costs of running a multinational net-
7work. For NEs and for domestic plants of horizontal MNEs the plant-speci¯c
¯xed input requirements are equal to 1 unit of unskilled labor. Setting up a
plant abroad requires 1 + ° units of unskilled labor, re°ecting the associated
¯xed cost disadvantages of MNEs.
Under full employment, the factor market clearing conditions for unskilled

















+ aLZi (Ziii + Ziij)

















+ aSZi (Ziii + Ziij) + 2ni + (2 + µ)(hi + vi) ? wSi ¸ 0: (11)
Variable unit costs for the production of an X-variety are given by cXi =
aSXwSi + aLXwLi. Fixed costs are ¯nanced by operating pro¯ts. There is
a ¯xed markup over variable costs, which is determined by the elasticity of
substitution between varieties. Identical technologies and price elasticities of
demand ensure that the domestic price of a locally produced good (the mill
price) is identical in equilibrium across all ¯rms producing there. Therefore,
it is su±cient to use a single subscript for the producer prices, indicating the




jii. The consumer price for
varieties exported from country i to j is then pi(1+¿) ´ pn
iij = pv
jij. Given that
the demand for all varieties is positive due to our assumptions, the mill price





Free entry of ¯rms implies that after-tax pro¯ts are zero. Therefore, the
corresponding zero-pro¯t conditions determine the number of ¯rms. NEs in i
face ¯xed costs of FCn
i = 2wSi+wLi. After subtracting depreciation allowances,
these ¯xed costs have to be covered by after-tax operating pro¯ts. Operating
pro¯ts of NEs are subject to the domestic statutory corporate tax rate (ti). We
denote the share of ¯xed costs which is deductible from the tax base by ±i.6
6An alternative would be to apply depreciation allowances for variable costs additionally.
However, since variable costs are not deductible at the same rate as ¯xed costs, we do not rely
on this variant in the main text but relegate it to a sensitivity analysis. We brie°y discuss the
outcome of this model variant in Footnote 18, below.
















? ni ¸ 0: (13)
The ¯xed costs of MNEs are FCh
i = (2 + µ)wSi + wLi + (1 + °)wLj for
a horizontal MNE and FCv
i = (2 + µ)wSi + (1 + °)wLj for a vertical MNE,










(1 ¡ tj)(1 ¡ tM
ji )
+ ±iti(2wSi + wLi) + ±jtj(tM
ji ¡ tw




+ ±jtj(1 + tw



























? vi ¸ 0; (15)
where Dh
ij indicates the depreciation allowances of a horizontal MNE with head-
quarters in country i at market j, and similarly for the other depreciation al-
lowances. Our setting implicitly assumes that ¯xed costs are deductible only in
the country where the investment takes place. We further assume that MNEs
fully repatriate the pro¯ts of foreign subsidiaries to the domestic headquarters
(see Hartman, 1985; and Sinn, 1993, for a discussion). In this case, operat-
ing pro¯ts of foreign a±liate ¯rms are subject to corporate taxation in the host
country (tj). Under repatriation, foreign-earned pro¯ts are additionally subject
to withholding taxes (tw
j ) and taxation at home (tM
ji ), where the ¯rst subscript
in tM
ji denotes the origin and the latter the destination of the dividend °ow.
Hence, if double taxation is not alleviated unilaterally or bilaterally (via tax
treaties), foreign a±liate income is exposed to double taxation. The extent to
which double taxation occurs depends on the method of double taxation relief












= ti(1 ¡ tw
j ) + tw
j (deduction) (16)
All production factors are owned by the households, so that consumer in-
come is determined by the sum of factor rewards in country i (wSiSi + wLiLi)
plus the eventual transfers of tax revenues to them. Below, we discuss two
modes of public spending of tax revenues, where only one of them involves such
transfers.
3.3 Public sector
The only source of tax revenues are taxes on operating pro¯ts of ¯rms. Hence,






























































Tax revenues are either used to ¯nance a lump-sum transfer to consumers or
to provide public infrastructure to the ¯rms to lower their ¯xed input require-
ments (see Kellenberg, 2003, for a treatment of infrastructure in a model with
MNEs). In case of lump-sum transfers, the gross national income of country i
(Ei) includes the tax revenues collected by its government. In case of public
infrastructure provision, no such transfers occur and the gross national income
equals total factor income in i. We assume that one unit of public infrastructure
needs one unit of skilled labor and one unit of unskilled labor.8 Accordingly,
public infrastructure (Ii) in country i equals
7See Bond and Samuleson (1989), Janeba (1995), and Davies (2003) for a theoretical analy-
sis on the e®ects of the methods of double taxation relief on the volume of foreign investment.
Davies (2004) provides a survey.
8This guarantees that the production of public infrastructure as such only induces minor





Under the assumption that public infrastructure reduces the ¯xed factor
requirement of ¯rms headquartered in a given country, the ¯xed costs of setting




(Ii + 1)¯ ; (19)
where ¯ > 0 is a scaling parameter. Similarly, the ¯xed costs for horizontal




(2 + µ)wSi + wLi
(Ii + 1)¯ +
(1 + °)wLj




(Ii + 1)¯ +
(1 + °)wLj
(Ij + 1)¯ : (21)
3.4 Model parameterization
Due to the non-linearities and the numerous possible corner solutions, an an-
alytical solution of the model is infeasible (see Markusen and Venables, 1998,
2000; Markusen, 2002). Therefore, we derive the empirically testable hypothe-
ses of interest by means of numerical simulation, using the following parameter
values. World factor endowments are set at L = 200 and K = 50. a = 0:9 for
the skilled labor coe±cient in the CES technology of Z. The production of the
di®erentiated X-good is relatively more skilled labor intensive with ¯xed input
coe±cient of aLX = 0:75 and aSX = 0:25 (see Markusen, 2002). We parame-
terize the additional e®ort of transferring knowledge abroad with µ = 0:1 and
the additional resources required for setting up a plant abroad with ° = 0:1.
According to the United Nation's World Trade Database, the share of man-
ufacturing goods trade in the 1990s is about 70 to 80 percent of total trade.
Therefore, we assume an expenditure share for manufactures of ¹ = 0:8. We
consider ¾ = 4 as value for the elasticity of substitution, which is close to the
one usually applied in the knowledge-capital literature (see Markusen, 2002).
Trade costs are assumed to be high with ¿ = 0:25 being in line with Carr,
Markusen, and Maskus (2001). Finally, the elasticity of substitution in the
production of the homogeneous good is (1=(1 ¡ ½)) = 3.
Concerning the public sector, we initially set the corporate tax rates sym-
11metrically at ti = tj = 0:3, which roughly resembles the average corporate tax
rate in the OECD countries in 2004. We account for the fact that bilateral tax
treaties prevail among the countries of interest and set the withholding tax rate
at a low level, tw
i = tw
j = 0:05. We assume that about 20 percent of ¯xed costs
are tax deductible so that ± = 0:2.9 In the case where tax revenues are used
to ¯nance public infrastructure, the scaling parameter determining the relative
importance of public infrastructure is set at ¯ = 0:1.
4 Simulation results and hypotheses
Without corporate taxation (i.e., setting all parameters of taxation to zero) the
chosen calibration of the model leads to a pattern of a±liate production which
is virtually identical to the one in Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and in
Markusen and Maskus (2002). Below, we measure foreign a±liate activity as
the share of outbound a±liate production of country i (de¯ned as (hi+vi)Xijj+
viXiji) in the world production of X. Horizontal multinational ¯rms prevail,
if country size and relative factor endowments are not too di®erent. Vertical
multinationals come into existence only, if relative factor endowment di®erences
(i.e., production cost di®erences) are large enough. Higher trade costs (foreign
plant set-up costs) discourage NEs (MNEs).
Figure 1 displays foreign a±liate production in an Edgeworth box with fac-
tor endowments on the axes for the benchmark case without corporate taxation.
First, consider factor endowments along the main diagonal indicating countries
with identical relative factor endowments. Here, NEs and horizontal MNEs
prevail, and foreign a±liate production is higher the more similar the countries
are in size. Second, moving from the center towards the North-Western corner
implies larger di®erences in relative factor endowments, inducing an increase in
foreign a±liate production by vertical MNEs, all else equal. In the subsequent
analysis we introduce corporate taxation and primarily focus on the case where
tax revenues are used to ¯nance public infrastructure. However, in qualitative
terms, the e®ects are similar for lump-sum transfers. The reason is that cor-
porate taxation a®ects the equilibrium plant con¯guration even if tax revenues
are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion.10
9In our empirical analysis below, we measure tax base reducing allowances by depreciation
rates including ¯rst-year extra depreciations (see Devereux and Gri±th, 1999, 2003). The net
present value of depreciation allowances for tax purposes is about 30 percent higher than the
assumed depreciation rate in the model simulation. The means of the periodical depreciation
rates in the sample are about 22 percent (machinery) and 5 percent (buildings), respectively.










































Origin for country i
Figure 1: Share of a±liate production without corporate taxation
Figure 2 displays the share of foreign a±liate production under the exemp-
tion or credit method.11 In this case, multinational activity is a®ected only to
a minor extent by corporate taxation (see the small di®erences between Figures
1 and 2).12 Only for small countries near the main diagonal we observe less
foreign a±liate activity of horizontal MNEs, resulting from the additional tax
burden for MNEs due to withholding taxes. The foreign a±liate activities of
vertical MNEs located in the North-Western corner of the Edgeworth box are
more or less una®ected by pro¯t taxation.
Compared to tax credit and exemption methods the deduction method is
associated with a higher tax burden on MNEs. Accordingly, the distortion
of multinational activity induced by corporate taxation becomes more evident
under deduction. Figure 3 illustrates that the foreign activity of horizontal
MNEs is signi¯cantly reduced as compared to the case of the exemption and the
credit method, especially for small countries.13 In small economies, ¯rms choose
serving the foreign markets via exports since double taxation reduces foreign
a±liate pro¯ts required to cover the ¯xed costs abroad. However, if the home
country is large enough and tax revenue is used to ¯nance public infrastructure,
horizontal MNEs come into existence even under deduction. In this case, tax
upon request but are suppressed here for the sake of brevity.
11Note that we assume symmetric tax rates in the initial equilibrium so that the exemption
and the credit methods have an identical e®ect.
12See also Figure 5 in the Appendix, displaying the di®erence between the surfaces in Figure
2 and Figure 1.










































Origin for country i
Figure 2: Share of a±liate production with exemption or credit method
(ti = tj = 0:3; tw
i = tw
j = 0:05; ±i = ±j = 0:2; public infrastructure investments)
revenues are high enough to ¯nance public infrastructure, reducing ¯xed plant
setup costs to compensate the disadvantages of double taxation. Again, the
production decisions of vertical MNEs are nearly una®ected by double taxation.
In the following, we focus on four factor endowment con¯gurations within
the Edgeworth box to derive the e®ects of the considered tax parameters on
MNE activity.14 For each of these endowment points and each method of dou-
ble taxation relief (credit, exemption, and deduction), we compare the foreign
a±liate production in the reference case as described in Section 3.4 with a
counterfactual where the taxation parameters of interest are increased by one
percentage point, one at a time. Our parameterization (symmetric tax rates)
is not suitable to illustrate the di®erential e®ects of taxation under the credit
method as compared to exemption. Therefore, we allow initial tax rate di®er-
entials between domestic and foreign countries in alternative scenarios. The
results are summarized in Table 1.
We consider the following endowment con¯gurations. First, one where coun-
try i is small but the relative factor endowments are identical across countries at
Li=(Li +Lj) = Si=(Si +Sj) = 0:15. There, country i's foreign a±liate produc-
tion is small, amounting to only 1:65 percent of the world production of X under
tax credit or exemption (there is no MNE activity under deduction at this en-
dowment con¯guration). Second, at zero relative factor endowment di®erences,
14We do not consider any impact of taxation on outbound MNE activity of an unskilled










































Origin for country i
Figure 3: Share of a±liate production with deduction method (ti = tj = 0:3;
tw
i = tw
j = 0:05; ±i = ±j = 0:2; public infrastructure investments)
Li=(Li+Lj) = Si=(Si+Sj) = 0:85, country i is large relative to j. Still, its MNE
activity is relatively small. Country i's foreign a±liate production amounts to
14:98 percent of the world production of X under tax credit or exemption and
to 8:07 percent under deduction, respectively. Third, in the center of the Edge-
worth box the two countries are identical in size and relative factor endowments
with Li=(Li +Lj) = Lj=(Li +Lj) = Si=(Si +Sj) = Sj=(Si +Sj) = 0:5. There-
fore, exactly 50 percent of a horizontal MNE's production takes place in its
foreign subsidiary. Vertical MNEs do not exist in this case. The foreign a±l-
iate production of country i accounts for 25 percent of the overall production
of X by NEs and MNEs, irrespective of the applied method of double taxa-
tion relief. Finally, consider an endowment allocation where country i is skilled
labor abundant with Li=(Li +Lj) = 0:15 and Si=(Si +Sj) = 0:85. At this con-
¯guration, it headquarters mainly vertical MNEs that exploit the gains from
comparative advantage, and 45:26 (45:94) percent of the production of X are
due to country i's foreign subsidiary activity under credit or exemption (deduc-
tion). Table 1 also provides a summary of the e®ects of a one percent increase
in each of the parameters of taxation on country i's MNE activity, separately.
The impact of statutory corporate tax rates on MNE activity: Under











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16foreign a±liate production.15 The reason for the positive nexus of parent coun-
try tax rates and outbound MNE activity is that the change in its tax rate only
a®ects domestic production. For similar reasons, a higher tax rate in the host
country reduces a±liate production there. Hence, the predicted e®ect of an
increase in parent (host) country corporate tax rates on a country's outbound
MNE activity is positive (negative) under exemption.
With the credit method, the e®ects of corporate tax rates are ambiguous if
horizontal MNE activity prevails (i.e., the factor endowment di®erences are not
important; see the ¯rst three endowment con¯gurations under tax credits in
Table 1). As becomes apparent from (16), the impact of a tax increase depends
on the di®erential between domestic and foreign corporate tax rates. If the
parent country is in an excess credit position (i.e., its corporate tax rate is
lower than the host country tax burden; see footnote c in Table 1) the e®ect of
the parent country's tax increase is the same as under the exemption method.
An increase in the statutory tax rate of the parent country fosters its foreign
a±liate production. The tax increase, by contrast, applies to operating pro¯ts
of foreign a±liates if the parent tax rate is equal to or higher than the host
tax burden. This reduces foreign a±liate activities of horizontal MNEs, while
rendering the domestic production of host country owned ¯rms better o®.16 For
similar reasons, an increase in the host country's corporate tax rate induces the
opposite e®ect.
With a deduction system, an increase in the corporate tax rate reduces MNE
activities in both countries,17 with two exceptions. First, if both countries
are identical, an increase in the host country corporate tax rate fosters foreign
a±liate activity there, as long as the tax burden becomes not prohibitively high.
Although the tax burden is increased for all (domestic and foreign) MNEs, the
foreign ones are even more exposed to double taxation. Second, for skilled labor
abundant parent countries, an increase in the parent country's corporate tax
15Slemrod (1990) was the ¯rst who has pointed to a positive relationship between the parent
country tax rate and outbound FDI, especially under the exemption system. In this regard,
Hartman (1990, p. 121) criticized that "... the sign of the home country taxation parameter
is indeterminate from economic theory." According to the insights from our model, Slemrod
rightfully suggested using parent country corporate tax rates as a determinant of outbound
FDI.
16In the case of identical factor endowments, the impact of a parent country's tax increase
on foreign a±liate activity is only positive if both countries are in an excess credit position,
i.e., (tj ¡t
w
i (1¡ti)) < ti < (tj +t
w
j (1¡tj)), obtaining the same result as with the exemption
method.
17As discussed above, the deduction method leads to zero MNE activity for a small country.
For such a situation, we are not able to identify a change in MNE activity due to an increase
in the tax parameters. However, to illustrate the impact of tax changes we re-parameterize
the model such that MNE activity arises in the initial equilibrium (see footnote b in Table 1).
17rate fosters its foreign a±liate activity at the expense of the NE activity there.
The impact of withholding tax rates on MNE activity: The e®ects of
an increase in the withholding tax rate are unambiguous and straight-forward.
An increase in the host country's withholding tax rate increases the tax burden
of the parent country's MNEs only, irrespective of the method of double taxation
relief. Consequently, MNE activity there is then reduced.
The impact of depreciation allowances on MNE activity: If the parent
country provides more generous depreciation allowances (re°ected in a higher
level of ±i), the model predicts an increase of the parent's horizontal outbound
MNE activity. The reason for this result lies in the assumption that ¯xed costs
are deductible in the country where they are actually paid (¯rm-speci¯c and do-
mestic plant-speci¯c ¯xed costs in the parent country and foreign plant-speci¯c
¯xed costs abroad). Hence, domestically headquartered MNEs gain the most,
as they face the highest ¯xed costs. However, this e®ect exists only under cross-
hauling, i.e., the coexistence of outbound and inbound horizontal MNE activity
at small (zero) relative factor endowment di®erences. The e®ects of depreciation
allowances are reversed if large relative factor endowment di®erences exist and
vertical MNEs prevail.18 Since vertical MNEs do not operate a production facil-
ity at the headquarters' location, they only can deduct ¯xed plant set-up costs
(in contrast to domestic NEs or horizontal MNEs). Accordingly, an increase
in domestic depreciation allowances leads to a distortion in favor of domestic
NEs and vertical outbound MNE activity is crowded out. An increase in the
depreciation allowances in an unskilled labor abundant host country attracts
even more a±liate production there and fosters the parent country's vertical
outbound MNE activity. In the remaining factor con¯gurations, we obtain the
opposite sign to a change in depreciation allowances in the parent country.
5 Speci¯cation of bilateral outbound FDI
Our empirical analysis employs a panel data set of real bilateral outbound FDI
stocks among the OECD economies with annual information between 1991 and
2002. To guard against the bias from omitted time-invariant variables and
time-speci¯c common shocks that a®ect all country-pairs in the same way, we
include ¯xed country-pair and time e®ects. The speci¯cation of the empirical
18The e®ects of ±i and ±j are also reversed if depreciation allowances are not only applied
to ¯xed costs but also to variable costs, as indicated in Footnote 6.
18model follows our theoretical framework and is also in line with recent empirical
research emphasizing parent and host country size, their skilled labor endow-
ments, trade and investment costs, and interaction terms thereof as the most
important determinants of MNE activity (Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001;
Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Blonigen, Davies, and Head, 2003). Whereas most
of the estimated speci¯cations employ dependent and independent variables in
levels, Mutti and Grubert (2004) ¯nd that a speci¯cation in logs is superior
from an econometric point of view.
Therefore, we specify the log of FDI stocks from country i to country j
in year t, FDIijt, as a log-linear function of the following explanatory vari-
ables. The sum of parent and host country GDP in period t, §GDPijt =
logGDPit + logGDPjt, the similarity between the parent and the host mar-
ket in country size, ¢GDP2
ijt = (logGDPit ¡ logGDPjt)2, and four inter-
action terms to account for the impact of knowledge-capital (skilled labor
endowment di®erences, ¢SKijt = logSKit ¡ logSKjt) on FDI: INT1ijt =
¢SKijt£¢GDPijt£I(¢SKijt > 0), where ¢GDPijt = (logGDPit¡logGDPjt)
and I(¢SKijt > 0) is a dummy variable that is set to 1, if ¢SKijt > 0, and 0
else; INT2ijt = ¢SKijt £ §GDPijt £ I(¢SKijt > 0); INT3ijt = ¡¢SKijt £
§GDPijt £ I(¢SKijt < 0), where I(¢SKijt < 0) is a dummy variable that is
set to 1, if ¢SKijt < 0, and 0 else; and INT4ijt = ¢SKijt£logDISTij, where
DISTij is the great circle distance between the parent's and the host's capitals,
serving as a proxy for trade costs. According to the literature, horizontal FDI
is expected to rise, if the two economies become larger and more similar (i.e.,
§GDPijt rises and ¢GDPijt declines). Vertical FDI is expected to increase,
if the parent country becomes smaller and/or relatively better endowed with
skilled labor, especially, if the trade costs between the two countries are low.
Hence, we expect a positive sign for the parameters of §GDPijt and ¢GDP2
ijt,
but a negative one for the parameters of INT1ijt;:::;INT4ijt.
In addition to the variables motivated by the original knowledge-capital
model, the above variant of it supports the use of the following components
of country-pair speci¯c (bilateral) tax rates: the parent and the host country
statutory corporate tax rates (tit;tjt), whose impact depends on the prevailing
method of double taxation relief established in tax treaties (i.e., exemption,
credit, and deduction);19 the withholding tax rate applying to repatriated prof-
19Note that for about 97 percent of the observations a tax treaty is e®ective. Of the remain-
ing three percent, about one percentage point (i.e., 18) of the observations are covered by the
European Union's Parent-Subsidiary Directive (Directive 90/435) that applies to FDI within
the European Union. For the remaining two percent (i.e., 54) observations in our database,
methods of double taxation relief (exemption, credit, deduction) are applied unilaterally.
19its in a given host country (tw
jt); and the parent and host country-speci¯c net
present values of depreciation allowances (±it;±jt). To avoid a possible endo-
geneity bias, we use the lagged values of all tax variables.20
Regarding the parent country's statutory tax rate, we have no clear-cut hy-
pothesis on the sign of the parameter estimate. However, the above theoretical
model suggests that its impact depends on the skilled-to-unskilled labor endow-
ment ratio in the parent country relative to the host (see Table 1). We include
the interaction term ti;t¡1 £ ¢SKij;t¡1 £ I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0), where we expect a
positive sign for the exemption as well as the credit method. Additionally, we
include the present values of depreciation allowances, ±i;t¡1 and ±j;t¡1, and two
interaction terms between the depreciation allowances and the skill di®erences,
±i;t¡1£¢SKij;t¡1£I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0) and ±j;t¡1£¢SKij;t¡1£I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0).
Similar to the parent country statutory corporate tax rate, the inclusion of these
interaction terms is necessary, since the theoretical model does not predict a
clear-cut relationship between the depreciation allowances and outbound FDI.
The theoretical model predicts a negative parameter for the ¯rst and a positive
one for the second interaction term.
Overall, the empirical speci¯cation reads as follows
FDIijt = ¯1ti;t¡1 + ¯2tj;t¡1 + ¯3tw
j;t¡1 + ¯4±i;t¡1 + ¯5±j;t¡1
+ ¯6[ti;t¡1 £ ¢SKij;t¡1 £ I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0)]
+ ¯7[±i;t¡1 £ ¢SKij;t¡1 £ I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0)]
+ ¯8[±j;t¡1 £ ¢SKij;t¡1 £ I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0)]
+ ¯9§GDPijt + ¯10¢GDP2
ijt + ¯11INT1ijt + ¯12INT2ijt
+ ¯13INT3ijt + ¯14INT4ijt + ¹ij + ¸t + "ijt (22)
where ¹ij and ¸t are ¯xed country pair and time e®ects, respectively. " is an
identically and independently distributed stochastic error term.
6 Empirical analysis
Baseline results: We provide details on the data sources and descriptive
statistics for all variables in the Appendix (Tables A1 to A3) and in Figure 4.
The ¯gure illustrates the change in all considered components of corporate tax-
20Given the large number of taxation-related variables (eight) it seems infeasible to employ
instrumental variable methods. However, with panel data one can use lagged values of the
tax variables to get rid of the endogeneity problem as long as the contemporaneous variation
in foreign direct investment does not cause a change in taxation in the past.
20ation: parent and host country statutory corporate tax rates, their depreciation
allowances, and the host economy's withholding tax rate.
The ¯gure covers the same sample of host countries and years that is consid-
ered in the empirical analysis. We report the mean as well as the minimum and
maximum values of each tax parameter and year. Obviously, there is enough
time variation in every component, rendering parameter estimation by a ¯xed
e®ects model feasible.
Table 2 summarizes the results for (i) the full sample (covering all country-
pairs and years, independent of the implemented method of double taxation
relief), (ii) the sub-sample covering the country-pairs which apply the exemp-
tion method, and (iii) the sub-sample covering country-pairs which apply the
credit method.21
To facilitate the comparison of the point estimates with the theoretical
hypotheses, we indicate in Table 2 whether our ¯ndings are in line with the
predictions (labelled 'Y ') or not ('N'). If the expected e®ects are ambiguous
according to Table 1, i.e., for the entries '+=¡' (e.g., the credit method), this
is indicated by a '?' in the table. All estimated standard errors and test statis-
tics are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, following Newey
and West (1987). In general, the model ¯t is quite well. Inspired by Razin,
Rubinstein, and Sadka (2005) we check for a potential bias due to sample se-
lection arising from missing FDI data. We follow Wooldridge (1995, 2002) in
applying testing procedures that are suited for panel data. However, in our
sample of OECD country-pairs, there is no indication for endogenous selec-
tion into the sample, given the adopted speci¯cation. This can be seen from
the insigni¯cant parameters of the inverse Mills' ratio reported in Table 2.
With regard to the usual knowledge-capital variables, we ¯nd across the board
that the impact of overall and relative country size (§GDPijt and ¢GDP2
ijt)
is in line with theory, whereas the skill-endowment interaction term parame-
ters (INT1ijt;:::;INT4ijt) are insigni¯cant in almost all speci¯cations.22 In
21In our sample, the exemption (credit) method applies for around 59 percent (34 percent)
of the observations (either through unilateral tax law or through bilateral tax treaties). The
remaining observations use the deduction method (around 7 percent). Since the latter group
contains only 149 observations, it is not possible to estimate the tax e®ects precisely for the
deduction sub-sample.
22In this regard, our ¯ndings do not match with the empirical results in Carr, Markusen,
and Maskus (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2002). However, there are four reasons for
this. First, we use stocks of outbound FDI rather than foreign a±liate sales as our dependent
variable (however, Blonigen, Davies, and Head, 2003, indicate that the results tend to be very
similar for FDI and foreign a±liate sales). Second, we apply a log-linear speci¯cation (as
suggested by Mutti and Grubert, 2004) rather than one in levels. Third, our sample covers a







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23the subsequent discussion of Table 2, we summarize our ¯ndings regarding the
impact of the tax variables on bilateral outbound FDI in the OECD.
In general, we would expect that the parent country tax rate exerts a posi-
tive impact on the country's outbound FDI.23 This is in line with the positive
point estimate in the pooled sample and in the exemption sub-sample. For
instance, the point estimate in the full sample indicates that a one percent-
age point increase in the parent country statutory tax rate (ti;t¡1) is associ-
ated with an increase in outbound FDI by about 0:85 percent. For the credit
method sub-sample, the impact of the parent country corporate tax rate is the-
oretically ambiguous, which is in line with our ¯ndings. The interactive term
ti;t¡1£¢SKij;t¡1£I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0) enters as expected in the sub-sample cov-
ering the exemption countries, but not so in the full sample and in the credit
sub-sample. Regarding the host country corporate tax rate, we expect a nega-
tive impact on a country's outbound FDI.24 This is con¯rmed by the empirical
¯nding of a signi¯cantly negative estimate of the corresponding parameter. Sim-
ilarly, Table 1 clearly suggests a negative relationship between the host country
withholding tax rate and outbound FDI, which is con¯rmed by the signi¯-
cantly negative parameter estimates in all samples. Finally, the parent country
depreciation allowances (±i;t¡1) exert a signi¯cantly negative impact on foreign
outbound FDI, which is not supported by the simulations in Table 1. A negative
but insigni¯cant e®ect is estimated for its host country counterpart (±j;t¡1), as
expected. Further, the point estimate of ±i;t¡1 £¢SKij;t¡1 £I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0)
is negative, and the one of ±j;t¡1 £ ¢SKij;t¡1 £ I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0) is positive,
being in line with the theoretical hypotheses. Across the board, the support
for the tax-related hypotheses is remarkable, considering the large number of
parameters to be estimated.
Sensitivity analysis and discussion: We check the sensitivity of our ¯nd-
ings in various ways. Table 3 provides a summary, pointing to their robustness
in qualitative terms. For the sake of brevity, we refer to the full sample in Table
from that one in Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2002), who
use U.S. foreign a±liate sales across a larger set of host countries over time. Finally, we
employ country-pair and time ¯xed e®ects. In particular, this wipes out all time-invariant
level information so that the parameters of the relatively time-invariant endowment variables
can hardly be estimated signi¯cantly.
23The predicted impact across all methods (i.e., the pooled sample) is ambiguous (see Table
1). However, the number of cases in our sample, where deduction is applied or the excess credit
position is evident is rather small. Accordingly, we expect the positive impact to dominate in
the pooled sample.
24Again, the prediction is ambiguous, but we expect the negative impact to dominate for
the same reasons as in the previous footnote.
242 and only report the taxation parameters of interest.
In the ¯rst sensitivity check, we replace tertiary school enrollment by al-
ternative skill measures in the construction of INT1ijt;:::;INT4ijt and the
interaction terms involving ¢SKij;t¡1: gross secondary school enrollment in
Model A; the sum of professional, technical, kindred and administrative work-
ers to total employment in Model B (as in Carr, Markusen, and Maskus 2001;
and Markusen and Maskus, 2002); and physical capital stocks per worker in
Model C. As can be seen, most of the point estimates, especially the ones
of statutory tax rates and depreciation allowances, exhibit the same sign as
in Table 2. Only in the case of host country depreciation allowances (±j;t¡1)
we obtain positive but insigni¯cant parameter estimates in Models A and C
which should be negative according to the predictions of the theoretical model.
Similarly, the sign of ±i;t¡1 £ ¢SKij;t¡1 £ I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0) is now positive
in Models A and C (it was and should be negative), and the coe±cient of
±j;t¡1 £¢SKij;t¡1 £I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0) becomes positive in Models B and C (it
was negative in Table 2, as expected). ti;t¡1 £ ¢SKij;t¡1 £ I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0)
is now positive in Models B and C, as it should be (it was negative before).
Generally, we would prefer the original model in Table 2 and Model A in Table
3 over Models B and C, since the sample size is substantially reduced for the
latter ones (to 1011 and 1410 observations, respectively). Further, as can be
seen from Table A3 in the Appendix, the correlation between the interaction
e®ects is much lower for tertiary school enrollment than for secondary school
enrollment. Therefore, we consider the original model as preferable over Model
A.
The second sensitivity check (Model D) replaces the knowledge-capital
model variables that are not related to corporate taxation by standard grav-
ity model variables (i.e., parent and host country GDP and GDP per capita).
For instance, such a speci¯cation is employed by Mutti and Grubert (2004),
B¶ enassy-Qu¶ er¶ e, Fontagn¶ e, and Lahrµ eche-R¶ evil (2005), and also by Blonigen
and Davies (2004) in a paper on the tax treaty e®ects on FDI. In Model
D, the parameter signs are very similar to their counterparts in the original
model, except for the interaction e®ects ti;t¡1 £¢SKij;t¡1 £I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0),
±i;t¡1£¢SKij;t¡1£I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0) and ±j;t¡1£¢SKij;t¡1£I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0),
which have changed their sign. ti;t¡1£¢SKij;t¡1£I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0) is now sig-
ni¯cantly positive, as expected. However, it must be said that a test on the joint
signi¯cance of the skilled labor endowment variables INT1ijt;:::;INT4ijt indi-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26model for bilateral FDI in our sample of country-pairs and years.
Next, we estimate a dynamic model including lagged outward FDI stocks
on the right-hand-side of the regression (Model E; see Devereux and Freeman,
1995, for such a speci¯cation). To avoid an endogeneity bias inherent in dynamic
panel data models with ¯xed e®ects (see Baltagi, 2005, p. 135), we use a GMM
estimator based on ¯rst di®erences as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
However, the estimated parameter for the lagged dependent variable is rather
low at 0.22 and not signi¯cant at 10 percent (see the notes of Table 3). The
remaining coe±cients are very close to the original ones (with the exceptions of
ti;t¡1£¢SKij;t¡1£I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0) and ±j;t¡1£¢SKij;t¡1£I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0),
where the signs change).
Furthermore, we exclude the transition economies (Model F) and, alterna-
tively, the transition countries as well as the non-EU members from the sample
(Model G). Especially the transition economies have reduced their statutory
corporate tax rates signi¯cantly within the sample period and faced a strong
increase in inward FDI at the same time, which might exert a crucial impact
on the estimation results. However, with the exception of the interaction terms
ti;t¡1£¢SKij;t¡1£I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0) and ±j;t¡1£¢SKij;t¡1£I(¢SKij;t¡1 > 0)
we obtain the same signs for the coe±cients of interest in Model F as in the
original model. In Model G, several of the originally signi¯cant parameter esti-
mates are now insigni¯cant, especially the one of the host country statutory tax
rate. This comes at no surprise, since the sample size is dramatically reduced
to only 846 observations in this experiment.
In the last two exercises, we control for weighted third-country explanatory
variables to make sure that the parameters of the bilateral variables are not
a®ected qualitatively by the exclusion of third-country e®ects in the regres-
sions. An inclusion of third-country explanatory variables can be justi¯ed from
the perspective of recent theoretical work on complex multinational ¯rms (see
Yeaple, 2003; Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2005; and Grossman, Helpman,
and Szeidl, 2006). In particular, Model H includes simple third-country aver-
ages of all explanatory variables.25 Model I includes inverse-distance-weighted
25For instance, the third-market parent country corporate tax rate is the simple average of
the lagged corporate tax rate of all other parent countries in a particular year, and similarly
for all other variables that vary across parent countries and years only. In contrast, the third-
market host country corporate tax rate is the simple average of the lagged corporate tax
rate of all other host countries in a particular year, and similarly for all other variables that
vary across host countries and years only. Finally, all variables that vary across country-pairs
are simple averages across the parent and host country dimensions in each year. Not only
the tax parameters but also all other explanatory variables enter in their bilateral and their
third-market form, simultaneously.
27averages of the third-market variables instead.26 The third-market variables
are jointly signi¯cant according to the F-tests in Table 3. Yet, the exclusion of
third-market variables from our original speci¯cations does not exert a qualita-
tive impact on the bilateral determinants of interest. This is not as surprising,
since third-market averages of the explanatory variables do not vary much in
the time dimension. Controlling for all time-invariant variables in our ¯xed
country-pair e®ects framework reduces their correlation with the bilateral ef-
fects substantially, so that a possible bias in the parameter estimates is avoided.
How do the results relate to those in previous research? Similar to the above
mentioned evidence regarding U.S. outbound FDI (see, e.g., Grubert and Mutti,
1991, 2000; Hines and Rice, 1994; Mutti and Grubert, 2004; Desai, Foley, and
Hines, 2005), parent (host) country tax rates exert a positive (negative) impact
on outward FDI in our large panel of countries. Our point estimates of 0.850
(for parent's corporate tax rate) and -1.428 (for host's corporate tax rate) for
the full sample in Table 2 translate into an elasticity of 0.3 and -0.5, respectively.
These values are at the lower bound of the range of results in previous studies
(see de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). However, one should be careful with such a
direct comparison, since we control for withholding tax rates and depreciation
allowances beyond the statutory corporate tax rates. The present results clearly
indicate that it is decisive to consider these variables in addition to the statutory
tax rates when analyzing the impact of company taxation on FDI.
7 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the role of corporate taxation for outbound FDI. In doing
so, the paper pays particular attention to the fact that FDI °ows among the
developed economies are not subject to country-speci¯c but rather to country-
pair-speci¯c taxation. This follows from the prevalence of tax treaties (or the
Parent-Subsidiary-Directive within the EU) among these countries, where devi-
ations from unilateral taxation principles are the rule rather than the exception.
One could think of bilateral e®ective tax rates as nonlinear aggregates of their
components: parent and host country statutory corporate tax rates, where the
26Note that market interdependencies are assumed to be inversely related to distance, since
complex multinationals engage in trade (see Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton, 2004,
for an application). There, we apply the weights e
¡DISTkl to compute the respective averages.
DISTkl denotes the great circle distance between the economic centers of countries k and l.
In this way, our speci¯cation simultaneously accounts for interdependencies among parent
countries and among host economies (see Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton, 2004,
2005, for a separate treatment of these interdependencies).
28levels of the former depend on the applied assignment of taxing rights (i.e.,
credit, exemption or deduction method), bilateral withholding tax rates, and
depreciation allowances. These components exert a non-monotonic impact on
FDI. Accordingly, economic theory motivates an analysis of the role of corporate
taxation on FDI at the level of separate tax parameters rather than e®ective
tax rates.
The hypotheses can be derived from a theoretical approach that distin-
guishes between the respective parameters. For this, we employ a knowledge-
capital general equilibrium model of national and multinational ¯rms as the un-
derlying framework. An empirical analysis relying on the components of corpo-
rate taxation has not yet been pursued. A crucial prerequisite for such an analy-
sis is the availability of a data base that disentangles these components. We
construct such a data base for all country-pairs covering 26 OECD economies
and the period 1991 to 2002. Our empirical ¯ndings for the role of corporate
taxation on FDI stocks within this sample provide strong support for the hy-
pothesis derived in a knowledge-capital general equilibrium model of national
and multinational ¯rms. By and large, an increase in parent (host) country
statutory tax rates tends to foster (reduce) outbound FDI stocks. Host country
withholding tax rates exert an unambiguously negative impact on outbound
FDI. Parent and host country depreciation allowances have a non-monotonic
impact on outbound FDI, as expected from our theoretical model. The signs of
several of the parameters inherently depend on the relative factor endowment
con¯gurations as predicted by the knowledge-capital model of multinational
¯rms.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Michael Devereux, Eckhard Janeba, Assaf Razin, Nadine
Riedel, Efraim Sadka, Hans-Werner Sinn and participants at the annual meet-
ings of the Austrian Economic Society, the Canadian Economic Association,
the Western Economic Association, the CESifo "Global Economy" area confer-
ence, the ZEW Summer Workshop on "EU Countries in Fiscal Competition"
in Mannheim, and seminars at the Universities of Innsbruck, Paderborn and at
the ifo Institute for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from
the Austrian Fond zur FÄ orderung der wissenscha°ichen Forschung (FWF, grant
no. P 17028-G05) is gratefully acknowledged.
29References
Altshuler, R., H. Grubert, and T.S. Newlon, 2001. Has US investment abroad
become more sensitive to tax rates?, in J.R. Hines, Jr. (ed.), International
Taxation and Multinational Activity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Alworth, J.S., 1988. The ¯nance, investment and taxation decisions of multi-
nationals, Oxford: Blackwell.
Arellano, M. and S. Bond, 1991. Some tests of speci¯cation for panel data:
Monte Carlo evidence and an application to unemployment equations, The
Review of Economic Studies 58, 277-294.
Baier, S., G.P. Dwyer, and R. Tamura, 2002. How important are capital and
total factor productivity for economic growth?, unpublished manuscript,
Clemson University.
Baltagi, B.H., 2005. The econometrics of panel data, 3rd ed., Chichester: John
Wiley & Sons.
Bartik, T.J., 1985. Business location decisions in the United States: estimates
of the e®ects of unionization, taxes and other characteristics of States,
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 3, 14-22.
B¶ enassy-Qu¶ er¶ e, A., L. Fontagn¶ e, and A. Lahrµ eche-R¶ evil, 2005. How does FDI
react to corporate taxation?, International Tax and Public Finance 12,
583{603.
Blonigen, B.A. and R.B. Davies, 2004. The e®ects of bilateral tax treaties on
U.S. FDI activity, International Tax and Public Finance 11, 601{622.
Blonigen, B.A., R.B. Davies, and K. Head, 2003. Estimating the knowledge-
capital model of the multinational enterprise: Comment, American Eco-
nomic Review 93, 980-994.
Blonigen, B.A., R.B. Davies, G.R. Waddell, and H.T. Naughton, 2004. FDI in
space: Spatial autoregressive relationships in foreign direct investment,
NBER Working Paper No. 10939, Cambridge MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Blonigen, B.A., R.B. Davies, G.R, Waddell, and H.T. Naughton, 2005.
Spacey parents: spatial autoregressive patterns in inbound FDI, NBER
Working Paper No. 11466, Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Bond, E.W. and L. Samuleson, 1989. Strategic behavoir and the rules for in-
ternational taxation of capital, The Economic Journal 99, 1099-1111.
Braconier, H., P.-J. NorbÄ ack, and D. Urban, 2005. Reconciling the evidence of
the knowledge capital model, Review of International Economics, forth-
coming.
30Carr, D., J.R. Markusen, and K.E. Maskus, 2001. Estimating the knowledge-
capital model of the multinational enterprise, American Economic Review
91, 693-708.
Carstensen, K. and F. Toubal, 2004. Foreign direct investment in Central and
Eastern European countries: a dynamic panel analysis, Journal of Com-
parative Economics 32, 3-22.
Clark, S.W., 2000. Tax incentives for foreign direct investment: Empirical evi-
dence on e®ects and alternative policy options, Canadian Tax Journal 48,
1139-1180.
Coughlin, C.C., J.V. Terza, and V. Arromdee, 1991. State characteristics and
the location of foreign direct investment within the United States, Review
of Economics and Statistics 68, 675{683.
Cummins, J.G. and R.G. Hubbard, 1995. The tax sensitivity of foreign direct
investment: Empirical evidence from ¯rm level panel data, in M. Feldstein
(ed.), The E®ects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations, Chicago:
Chicago University Press.
Davies, R.B., 2003. The OECD model tax treaty: Tax competition and two-
way capital °ows, International Economic Review 44, 725-753.
Davies, R.B., 2004. Tax treaties and foreign direct investment: Potential versus
performance, International Tax and Public Finance 11, 775{802.
de Mooij, R.A. and S. Ederveen, 2003. Taxation and foreign direct investment:
a synthesis of empirical research, International Tax and Public Finance 10,
673-693.
Desai, M.A., F.C. Foley, and J.R. Hines, 2005. The demand for tax haven op-
erations, Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming.
Devereux, M.P., 2006. The impact of taxation on the location of capital, ¯rms
and pro¯t: A survey of empirical evidence, unpublished manuscript, Uni-
versity of Warwick.
Devereux, M.P. and H. Freeman, 1995. The impact of tax on foreign direct
investment: Emprical evidence and the implications for tax integration
schemes, International Tax and Public Finance 2, 85-106.
Devereux, M.P. and R. Gri±th, 1998. Taxes and the location of production:
evidence from a panel of US multinationals, Journal of Public Economics
68, 335-367.
Devereux, M.P. and R. Gri±th, 1999. The taxation of discrete investment
choices, IFS Working Paper No. W98/16, London: Institute for Fiscal
Studies.
Devereux, M.P. and R. Gri±th, 2003. Evaluating tax policy for location deci-
sions, International Tax and Public Finance 10, 107-126.
31Devereux, M.P., R. Gri±th, and A. Klemm, 2002. Corporate income tax re-
forms and international tax competition, Economic Policy 35, 451-495.
Devereux, M.P. and G.R. Hubbard, 2003. Taxing multinationals, International
Tax and Public Finance 10, 469-487.
Devereux, M.P. and B. Lockwood, 2006. Taxes and the size of the foreign-
owned capital stock: Which tax rates matter?, unpublished manuscript,
University of Warwick.
Dixit, A.K. and J.E. Stiglitz, 1977. Monopolistic competition and optimum
product diversity, American Economic Review 67, 297-308.
Ekholm, K., R. Forslid, and J.R Markusen, 2005. Export-platform foreign di-
rect investment, NBER Working Paper No. 9517, Cambridge MA: Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research.
Gresik, T.A., 2001. The taxing task of taxing multinationals, Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 39, 800-838.
Grossman, G.M., E. Helpman, and A. Szeidl, 2006. Optimal integration
strategies for the multinational ¯rm, Journal of International Economics,
forthcoming.
Grubert, H. and J. Mutti, 1991. Taxes, tari®s and transfer pricing in multina-
tional corporate decision making, Review of Economics and Statistics 73,
285{293.
Grubert, H. and J. Mutti, 2000. Do taxes in°uence where US multinational
corporations invest?, National Tax Journal 53, 825{839.
Grubert, H. and J. Slemrod, 1998. The e®ect of taxes on investment and in-
come shifting to Puerto Rico, Review of Economics and Statistics 80,
365{373.
Hartman, D.G., 1984. Tax policy and foreign direct investment in the United
States, National Tax Journal 37, 475-488.
Hartman, D.G., 1985. Tax policy and foreign direct investment, Journal of
Public Economics 26, 107-121.
Hartman, D.G., 1990. Comment on Slemrod "Tax e®ects on foreign direct in-
vestment in the US: evidence from a cross-country comparison", in A.
Razin and J. Slemrod (eds.), Taxation in the Global Economy, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Head, K.C., J.C. Ries, and D.L. Swenson, 1999. Attracting foreign manufac-
turing: Investment promotion and agglomeration, Regional Science and
Urban Economics 29, 197-218.
Hines, J.R., 1996. Altered states: taxes and the location of foreign direct in-
vestment in America, American Economic Review 86, 1076-1094.
32Hines, J.R., 1997. Tax policy and the activities of multinational corporations,
in A.J. Auerbach (ed.), Fiscal policy: lessons from economic research, Cam-
bridge MA: MIT Press.
Hines, J.R., 1999. Lessons from behavioral responses to international taxation,
National Tax Journal 52, 305-323.
Hines, J.R. and E.M. Rice, 1994. Fiscal Paradise: Foreign tax havens and
American business, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 149-182.
Janeba, E., 1995. Corporate income tax competition, double taxation treaties,
and foreign direct investment, Journal of Public Economics 56, 311{326.
Kellenberg, D.K., 2003. The provision of public inputs and foreign direct in-
vestment, Center for Economic Analysis Discussion Paper No. 03-11, De-
partment of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder
King, M.A. and D. Fullerton, 1984. The taxation of income from capital,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Markusen, J.R., 1997. Trade versus investment liberalization, NBER Working
Paper No. 6231, Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Markusen, J.R., 2002. Multinational ¯rms and the theory of international
trade, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.
Markusen, J.R. and K.E. Maskus, 2002. Discriminating among alternative the-
ories of the multinational enterprise, Review of International Economics
10, 694-707.
Markusen, J.R. and A.J. Venables, 1998. Multinational ¯rms and the new
trade theory, Journal of International Economics 46, 183-204.
Markusen, J.R. and A.J. Venables, 2000. The theory of endowment, intra-
industry, and multinational trade, Journal of International Economics 52,
209-234.
Mutti, J. and H. Grubert, 2004. Empirical asymmetries in foreign direct in-
vestment and taxation, Journal of International Economics 62, 337-358.
Newey, W.K. and K.D. West, 1987. A simple, positive semi-de¯nite, het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix, Econo-
metrica 55, 703-708.
OECD, 2001. Corporate tax incentives for foreign direct investment, OECD
Tax Policy Studies No. 4, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development.
Razin, A., Y. Rubinstein, and E. Sadka, 2005. Corporate taxation and bilat-
eral FDI with threshold barriers, NBER Working Paper No. 11196, Cam-
bridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
33Scholes, M.S. and M.A. Wolfson, 1990. The e®ects of changes in tax laws on
corporate reorganization activity, Journal of Business 63, S141-S164.
Shah, A. and J. Slemrod, 1991. Do taxes matter for foreign direct investment?,
World Bank Economic Review 5, 473-491.
Sinn, H.-W., 1993. Taxation and the birth of foreign subsidiaries, in H. Heber
and N. van Long (Eds.), Trade, Welfare, and Economic Policies, Essays
in Honor of Murray C. Kemp, University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor.
Slemrod, J., 1990. Tax e®ects on foreign direct investment in the US: evidence
from a cross-country comparison, in A. Razin and J. Slemrod (eds.), Tax-
ation in the Global Economy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Swenson, D.L., 1994. The impact of US tax reform on foreign direct investment
in the United States, Journal of Public Economics 54, 243-266.
Swenson, D.L., 2001. Transaction type and the e®ect of taxes on the distribu-
tion of foreign direct investment in the United States, in J.R. Hines (ed.),
International Taxation and Multinational Activity, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Yeaple, S.R., 2003. The complex integration strategies of multinationals and
cross country dependencies in the structure of foreign direct investment,
Journal of International Economics 60, 293-314.
Wooldridge, J.M., 1995. Selection corrections for panel data models under con-
ditional mean independence assumptions, Journal of Econometrics 68, 115-
132.
Wooldridge, J.M., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel
Data, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Appendix: Data and descriptive statistics
1. Data on foreign direct investment: We use bilateral outbound FDI stock data
into Europe as published by UNCTAD (FDI Country pro¯les), covering the period
1991-2002.
Parent country coverage: The sample contains a total of 22 OECD parent economies:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
34Host country coverage: There are 26 host countries in the sample: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
2. Data on country size and factor endowments: Real GDP ¯gures at constant
U.S. dollars (base year is 2000) are collected from the World Bank's World Develop-
ment Indicators. Gross tertiary (and, alternatively, gross secondary) school enrollment
¯gures from the same source serve as our measure of a country's skilled labor endow-
ment. Capital stocks are available from Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2002). The sum of
professional, technical, kindred and administrative workers is taken from the Yearbook
of Labor Statistics published by the International Labor Organization (ILO).
3. Tax rates, depreciation allowances, tax treaties: Information on tax codes and
bilateral tax treaties are primarily taken from the following online databases of the
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD):
² Central/Eastern Europe - Taxation & Investment
² Corporate Taxation in Europe
² Tax News Service
² Tax Treaties Database
Additionally, we exploit information of tax law from the following publications:
² Baker&McKenzie, 1999. Survey of the e®ective tax burden in the European Union,
Amsterdam.
² Commission of the European Communities, 1992. Report of the committee of
independent experts on company taxation, Brussels and Luxembourg.
² Commission of the European Communities, 2001. Towards an internal market
without tax obstacles. A strategy for providing companies with a consolidated
corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities, COM (2001) 582 ¯nal, Brussels.
² Ernst&Young, 2003. Company taxation in the new EU Member states survey of
the tax regimes and e®ective tax burdens for multinational investors, Frankfurt
am Main.
² OECD, 1991. Taxing Pro¯ts in a Global Economy: Domestic and International
Issues, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
² PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1999. Spectre: Study of potential of e®ective corporate
tax rates in Europe, Report commissioned by the Ministry of Finance in the
Netherlands, Amsterdam.
² Yoo, K.-Y., 2003. Corporate taxation of foreign direct investment income 1991-
2001, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 365, Paris: Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development.
The computation of the net present value of depreciation allowances is derived in King
and Fullerton (1984). The corresponding information on the number of years for which
depreciations can be claimed ('depreciation rate'), the depreciation system (i.e., straight
line or declining balance schedule) and on (general) investment incentives (e.g., extra
¯rst-year allowances in Australia, Poland or Spain) are taken from the above mentioned
sources. In cases where a ¯rm has several opportunities to choose from, we use the most
generous one.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Di®erence in a±liate production with and without corporate tax-
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Figure 6: Di®erence in a±liate production with and without corporate tax-
ation: Deduction method (di®erence between Figures 1 and 3)
Figures 5 and 6 provide a bird's eye view on the di®erence between the surfaces in Figures 2 and
1 and Figures 3 and 1, respectively. Obviously, corporate taxation exerts a negative impact on
the foreign a±liate production mostly of relatively small exemption/credit economies. There,
horizontal MNE activity is dominant in the equilibrium without taxation. Similarly, a small
deduction country's MNE activity is most likely hurt by taxation. Especially, the latter is
true for relatively (but not too) skilled labor abundant parent countries.
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